What does the Declaration of Independence mean when it says that all human beings are “created equal”? Let’s begin with what it does not mean. As Michael Pakaluk points out, “People today generally take it to mean something like equality of station or equality of outcome.” Equality of station for every human being is incompatible with functional organization of society. Not everyone, at the same time, can be the president of the United States, unless we drain that office of all functional power. Nor is to be “created equal” a matter of equality of outcome. As Thomas Sowell points out, “If there is not equality of outcomes among people born to the same parents and raised under the same roof, why should equality of outcomes be expected—or assumed—when conditions are not nearly so comparable?”
So, what does it mean to say that we are all created equal? Pakaluk argues:
Human beings are independent of one another as regards political power and authority: no human being, by nature, has any authority to rule over another. The Founders later tended to prefer the word “independent” to “equal” precisely for this reason—men are created independent. . . . No human being, no class, no family has political authority by nature, for each of us is made in the image of God.
If no human being is by nature born to rule over human beings, if we are all independent with respect to the power to rule, then political authority comes into existence through a social compact.
But this social compact is limited; we cannot give legitimate consent to anything whatsoever. Political authority is limited. How so?
The Declaration declares that we are endowed by our Creator with certain unalienable rights, including life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness. To alienate something is to have the power to dispose of that thing. Pakaluk writes:
I can dispose of it—give it away, throw it out, sell it. This power of disposal is what the Founders called alienation, from the Latin alienum, meaning “other than myself.” When I alienate something, it is no longer counted as mine. The ability to dispose of property is, in accounting and business, a standard mark of ownership.
If I have an unalienable right to live, I cannot dispose of my life as if it were mere property. I cannot legitimately authorize another person to intentionally kill me. Likewise, if I have an unalienable right to liberty, I cannot legitimately sell myself into slavery. In a similar way, if I have an unalienable right to the pursuit of happiness, I cannot legitimately alienate myself from what is necessary for me to pursue happiness.
In other words, when I enter into agreements with others, including agreements about determining our form of government, not everything is on the table. I cannot authorize the government to kill me or sell me into slavery or destroy my pursuit of happiness. Put another way, the consent of the governed does not extend to consenting to violations of natural rights arising from natural law. We may legitimately consent to many things, but we cannot legitimately consent to all things. Pakaluk writes:
Unalienable rights, understood in this way, are marks of God’s presence—of His supreme sovereignty—continuing to manifest itself within political society. . . . I have not—and cannot—contract away anything touching my life, my liberty, or my pursuit of happiness. These are, as it were, small islands of God’s continuing sovereignty within political society.
But if everyone has unalienable rights to life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness, does it follow that a government lacks authority to inflict legitimate punishments?
To answer this question, we need to consider the nature of just punishment. Just punishment is not a contract with the wrongdoer. As St. Thomas Aquinas notes, “Punishment is essentially something against the will.” A legitimate punishment deprives the wrongdoer of a good. The convicted criminal loses something valuable, like liberty or property. But at the same time, a just punishment is good because it restores the order of justice, protects society, deters wrongdoing, and, in some cases, reforms the wrongdoer. A just punishment is not a contract with the wrongdoer requiring the convicted criminal’s consent. A convicted murderer might not consent to the imprisonment as just punishment for murder. But whether the criminal agrees or not, a just punishment may be imposed. In other words, a just punishment is not a violation of unalienable rights.
The 250th birthday of the United States of America raises critical questions for our country. Do we believe that all human beings are created equal? Do we respect the unalienable rights of life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness of all people? Our answers and actions will determine whether, as Lincoln put it, “this nation, under God, shall have a new birth of freedom—and that government of the people, by the people, for the people, shall not perish from the earth.”
This article is part of a series in which Dr. Kaczor provides insights leading up to the celebration of the 250th anniversary of the Declaration of Independence.